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Nowadays one can easily observe common fascination with American
culture, American way of thinking and acting, and their gradual
dissemination as a part of Globalization or, being more precise, America-
nisation.1 The most Americanised areas include law, understood not only
as specific institutions of the American legal system transplanted into
other legal systems (the so-called legal transplants),2 but mostly as
a certain kind of legal culture in its broad sense. That legal culture
involves, inter alia, the proceedings of judges (justices) and lawyers,
various ways of reasoning and argumentation generally applied by
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1 As Americanisation should be understand as the influence which American culture has on
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way of life, business practice or political technique. See broadly: N. Cambell, J. Davis,
G. McKay (eds.), Issue in Americanisation and Culture, Edinburgh 2004; H. Fehrenbach,
U.G. Poiger. Americanization Reconsidered, in: Idem, eds., Transactions, Transgressions,
Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan, New York – Oxford 2000,
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by the Dominance of American Culture?, “Comparative Civilization Review” 2002, n. 47, p. 80-91;
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“Annales du Monde Anglophone” 2002, no. 15, p. 65-80.
2 On the concept of “legal transplants” see: A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to
Comparative Law, Edinburgh 1974, and critically: P. Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal
Transplants’, “Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law”, 1997, v. 4, 111-124.
American lawyers, different approaches to law, the philosophy under-
lying the American practice of law, and all other elements that constitute
the collective identity of American justices and lawyers, such as norms of
professional ethics or a conviction that there is a separate category of
thinking characteristic of lawyers.
One of the most important elements of the American legal culture is
law teaching, which is rather ignored in continental Europe. Law
teaching is considered important as illustrated by the generally accepted
stance of judge of US Supreme Court Felix Franfurter, who claimed that
“the law and lawyers are what the law schools make them.”3 In Poland,
a reform of law teaching is advocated by, inter alia, the representatives
of legal profession and academics who claim that it is necessary to bring
the Polish legal culture closer to American standards. Unfortunately,
many of the proposed changes, though some of them based on thorough
research,4 reflect stereotypical and very general views about American
law teaching institutions, ignoring the philosophical grounds as well as
the social and cultural context, in which those institutions were
developed. The aim of this article is to outline the broadly understood
cultural context of the three most popular law teaching methods in the
USA: Langdell’s Case Method together with Socratic Method, Clinical
Legal Education, and Problem Solving Method. Only when those
methods are presented against philosophical and cultural background,
will it be possible to assess their applicability in the faculties of law of
Polish universities.
Attempting to characterise the context in which particular American
law teaching methods came to life, attention should be drawn to certain
ideological premises common to each of the methods, that is to those
elements of the American legal culture which are universally accepted
by all those who deal with teaching law. They include: practical
character of teaching law and its close connection with the legal services
market, perceiving law more as a certain set of practical actions
performed by lawyers rather than as a system of scientific knowledge,
and necessity to produce lawyers who are attorneys (barristers) rather
than lawyers who are justices (public officials). Each of those features
will be accounted for in the paper.
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York 1979, p. 149.
4 Proposition of deep reform of model of legal education in Poland, which was most
comprehensive and based on profound research of American legal education was put forward by
Fryderyk Zoll. F. Zoll, Jaka szko³a prawa?: czy amerykañskie metody nauczania prawa mog¹
byæ przydatne w Polsce?, Kraków 2004.
The practical approach to teaching law, the aim of which is to prepare
students to enter legal services market soon after they have graduated,
is undoubtedly rooted in the tradition of teaching law within the
framework of the common law system, both in its more formalised
British version as well as much more liberal American one.5 The aim of
teaching law in English-speaking cultures has always been to prepare
practitioners, whose task is to provide legal counselling services and
represent the interests of their clients in court or before public
authorities. Graduates of law schools were therefore to provide profes-
sional legal services, which consisted in solving concrete problems
present in the social reality. As a preparation to do so, in the Middle
Ages in England, law students were taught in Inns of Court, that is
a sort of legal guilds where they could study real legal cases and
decisions of judges or other officials.6
Such education was more formalized in England, where supervision
was exercised over law teaching and admitting lawyers to legal practice.7
Meanwhile, it looked totally different in British colonies in America and
then in early years of the USA, where there were no constraints as
regards providing legal services and no criteria as regards who could be
deemed a professional lawyer.8 Everyone who had appropriate experience
could act as a lawyer.9 The most common way to gain such experience
was apprenticeship with an active barrister.10 It has to be noted that
until the second half of the 19th century there were no competence
verification methods in the USA. As a rule, an apprentice commenced
his activity the moment he was convinced his skills were adequate to
represent clients in court. Such teaching methods caused a variety of
complications, especially when it came to the quality of services. They
also reinforced the particularism of law in particular regions of the
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Education, “The Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal Education”, 2011, v. 8, no. 7; p. 12;
J. Baker, An introduction to English legal history , 4th edn., Butterworths, 2002, p. 171.
8 On the beginning of American legal education see: C.R. McMains, The History of First
Century American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, “Washington University Law Re-
view” 1981, v. 59, I. 3, p. 597-659.
9 P.D. Carrington, Heil Langdell! ,“Law and Social Inquiry”, 1995, v. 20, p. 699.
10 W.R Trail, W. R. Underwood, The Decline Of Professional Legal Training And A Proposal
For Its Revitalization In Professional Law Schools, “Baylor Law Review” 1996, v. 48, p. 204.
country. After the American Civil War they turned out not to keep up
with the social reality, which was becoming more and more complicated,
and the rapid social and economic development of the USA.11
Eventually, in the second half of the 19th century law teaching found
its place in university schools of law, and the process of acquiring
qualifications to act as a lawyer was formalised and professionalized.12
Nevertheless, the conviction that legal education should have vocational
character, so that lawyers could be prepared to render legal services,
remained unchanged. In fact, there can be said to have been certain
dogma in the American approach to teaching law and the role of
a lawyer in social relations – the primary aim of legal education was to
prepare lawyers to provide services on the private market, whereas
public service was of secondary importance.
That close connection between legal education and the principles
governing the legal services market is related to the second feature of
the American approach to law, that is the necessity to educate a lawyer-
-attorney rather than a lawyer-official.13 Producing the former was the
only way to interrelate legal education with social practice. In order to
become a justice, which was considered the most important of legal
professions, one had to first prove his worth as an outstanding attorney
or prosecutor. Legal practice was therefore necessary. That requirement
stemmed from the crucial role of precedents in legislation. Since justices
were, together with the parliament, responsible for law-making, they
had to possess outstanding knowledge of law. For pragmatic Americans
the only way to verify that knowledge was to assess how well one
performed on the legal services market. This is why specialist schools or
universities for justices were not established.
The American model of the way to become a justice was totally
different from the European one.14 where the judge was initially to be
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Democracy, “Duke Law Journal”, 1992, v. 41, p. 774-786.
12 See: R. Stevens, Law Schools: Legal Education in America from 1850s to 1980s, Chappel
Hill – London 1983.
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dowej Konferencji Krakowskiej Szko³y Wy¿szej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego), Kraków
2004, p. 194-195.
14 Also, contrary to Europe, some of justices are elected in general elections (in many states
this is the way to elect judges of state judiciary), which makes the American way of selection of
judges more democratic than in European countries. More detailed information on selection of
judges in particular states can be found on website: http://judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=, Accessed: 1 November 2016.
one of many royal officials bound by law and adjudicating cases on the
king’s behalf. Naturally, the Continental model involved a different way
of educating future judges, who were to be prepared to adjudicate
specific cases on the state’s behalf and in compliance with the law made
by the state. Approached in this way, the role of judges resembled the
role of officials. They were both bound by law and not able to establish
legal rules, with the difference that judges were to be autonomous and
independent of external pressures. Obviously, one could first work as
a barrister before becoming a judge, but in Europe that was an exception
rather than the rule.
Finally, the last characteristic feature of American legal culture (and
radically different from the European, continental one) is perceiving law
as a certain kind of practical actions rather than as an organized and
concise system of legal norms.15 Undoubtedly, this vision of law stems
from the characteristic features of the Common Law system such as
precedent law, which, in American conditions, used to play a more
important role than statutory law. On the one hand, the law made by
justices adjudicating concrete cases could be more flexible and adjusted
to the changing social reality. On the other hand, there was an
impression that law was a chaotic and random set of judicial decisions
rather than an organized and coherent legal system.
The situation changed after a reform of law teaching initiated by
Christopher Columbus Langdell in the second half of the 19th century,
when a new generation of lawyers was educated. That new generation
systematized the decisions of American justices into coherent and logical
jurisprudence.16 From then on, common law started to be considered
a set of systematized law-making elements and facts (acts passed by the
parliament, precedents, and, to a lesser extent, custom law). Nevertheless,
the principles of the American legal system could not be mastered
without knowing particular decisions on particular cases. It was not
possible to fully understand the common law system without referring to
judicial decisions. In many cases, precedents of the Supreme Court or
state courts influenced later legislative amendments.17
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and claim that it should be regarded as pure practice – that stance is represented by legal rea-
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Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Wiley-Blackwell 1996; Jerzy Stelmach, Ryszard Sarko-
wicz, Filozofia prawa XIX I XX wieku, Kraków 1999.
16 T.C. Gray, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, “University of Pittsburg Law Review” 1983, v. 45;
B.A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906-2000s,
“University of Illinois Law and History Review”, Summer 2004, Vol. 22, I. 277.
17 For example, the Supreme Court in 1954 ordered desegregation of public schools, and in
1973 decriminalized abortion. This activity of courts in public affairs is called “doctrine of
In the common law system, the principles of law and the general
theory of particular branches of law were formed by justices who
adjudicated concrete cases rather than university professors.18 The role
of the latter was to substantiate, develop, and sometimes adjust the
legal concepts formulated in courtrooms. Things looked different in
continental Europe, where many acts and legal solutions drew from
ideas developed in universities. Those ideas were then implemented by
means of legislation and corrected by judicial practice if necessary.19
Furthermore, in Europe the role of a university professor was frequently
combined with the that of a legal practitioner, whose task was to put
theory into practice. It can therefore be said that certain solutions of
common law were worked out by means of induction, that is an analysis
of individual decisions, which made it possible to formulate general
principles of law and concrete rules of law. By contrast, in the
continental law certain solutions were worked out by means of deduction,
that is an analysis of general principles laid down in the theory of law
and then passed by the parliament. By means of judicial decisions,
individual rules of adjudicating concrete cases were formulated.
Those two different ways of law-making and two different legal
systems had a crucial impact on law teaching. Preparation for the same
job looked totally different in two different cultures. In order to gain
knowledge and skills necessary to run a legal practice, students from one
continental culture had to refer to the sources of law different from those
of their colleagues’ from a common law country. In continental Europe,
what counted was the knowledge from textbooks and legal commentaries
written by professors of law who were responsible for the construction of
the legal system and its institutions. For this reason, the continental
model of teaching was lecture-oriented and required studying from legal
textbooks and commentaries. Then that knowledge was supplemented
with legal apprenticeship, which served as a preparation for performing
one of legal professions. Yet, the most important source of legal
knowledge were not judicial decisions but, above all, commentaries on
the regulations which served as grounds for issuing those decisions.
Things looked different in the USA, where it was not possible to
comprehend the essence of law and its content without knowing single
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Perspective, Macmillan 1991.
18 See: P.S. Atiyah, Theory and Pragmatism in English Law, London 1987, p. 1-43.
19 J.G. Sauveplanne, Codified and Judge Made Law. The Role of Courts and Legislator in
Civil and Common Law Systems, Amsterdam-Oxfor-New York 1982, p. 1-28.
key decisions or all jurisprudence along with its argumentation and
statements of reasons.20 Thus, it was crucially important to study and
analyze particular decisions, compare them with others, and derive
certain legal rules from numerous judicial decisions scattered all over
the judicial system. Although the regulations passed by the legislator
were important, priority was given to decisions and their interpretations
accepted during the course of court proceedings. This is why it was
essential to take a grip on the whole system of decisions.
All the aforementioned features exerted a significant influence on the
American methods of law teaching. At the same time, proposals to
reform legal education reflected an evolution which started at the end of
the 19th century and has been in progress till today. The first, oldest and
still most popular method of teaching law applied in the majority of
American law schools is the method developed by Christopher Columbus
Langdell, a long-standing dean of the school of law at Harvard
University starting from 1870.21 His method consisted in analyzing
selected decisions of appeal courts, presenting the results, and discus-
sing them with other students and the teacher in class.22 This method is
also called Case Study, though the name does not refer to the way
classes are conducted, but only to the analysis of a specific case conducted
by a student. The aim of the analysis of a case is to thoroughly reconstruct
facts, to analyse the argumentation of the parties, to reconstruct the fact
analysis method and the decision-making process of the court, and to
determine the essence of the rule of law produced by the court in the
decision. Alone, the presentation and confrontation of one’s results with
the results of other students during a discussion in class conducted by
a professor is called Socratic Method.23 The job of the teacher was to ask
the right questions, voice doubts, change the circumstances of the
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20 R.L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, “Villanova Law Review”,
1991, v. 36, p. 554, also W.E. Oberer, On Law, Lawyering and Law Professing: The Golden
Sand, “Journal of Legal Education” 1989, v. 39, no. 2.
21 More on Langdell Biography see: W. Schofield, Christophus Collumbus Langdell, “The
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cation. C.C. Langdell 1826-1906, Chapel Hill 2009.
22 Broadly on Case Method see: D. Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, Northwestern University
Law Review, 1995; C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law School,
“University of Cincinnati Law Review”, 2001, v. 70.
23 See: P. E. Areeda, The Socratic Method(SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound 1/31/90), “Harvard
Law Review”, 1996, v. 109, no. 5, p. 911-922; C.E. Schneider, The Socratic Method and the Goals
of Legal Education: With Some Thoughts Inspired by Travel, “Hogaku Kyoshitsu”, Sept. 1995,
p. 34; A. Kronman, The Socratic Method and the Development of the Moral Imagination, “Uni-
versity of Toledo Law Review”, 2000, vol. 31, p. 647-648.
discussed case in order to make the students express their opinions
quickly, make them justify their positions, and make them take an
attitude towards the criticism on the part of other students and the
professor. The name of the method originates from the practice of the
great Greek philosopher who used to force his interlocutors to discover
the truth about a discussed matter by themselves by asking them
questions in a skilful way.24
Initially, the aim of the method was to prepare future lawyers-
-investigators who were to discover certain objective rules present in the
social reality and visible in jurisprudence.25 However, it soon turned out
to be a perfect way of teaching large numbers of lawyers, which was
much more efficient and cheaper than the medieval guild-like method of
teaching. In Langdell’s method it was not only practical skills that were
taught, but also, and to a greater extent, a way of thinking about law
and the fundamentals of the identity of legal professions which underlay
the expression “thinking like a lawyer”.26 Although Langdell was not the
author of that expression (it appeared and spread in the 20th century), he
laid the foundations for perceiving lawyer’s thinking as something
distinct and special set against the background of other professions. It is
generally considered that Langdell’s concept of law perceived as scientific
knowledge examined by means of a case study, which led to the
formulation of the American common law system, gave birth to American
legal formalism which predominated in jurisprudence at the turn of the
20th and the 21st century.27
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24 The discussion of values of Langdell’s Method for law teaching was depicted by J. Srokosz,
The American discussion on the value of the Langdell’s education method of teaching students to
“thinking like a lawyer”, and possibility of its implementation in Polish legal education, [in:]
Aktuální otázky právní metodologie, M. Veèeøa, T. Machalová, J. Valdhans (eds), Brno 2014.
25 Langdell was convinced that law is kind of science, and should be analyzed by using scientific
methods. M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry. Legal Science form Leibnitz to Langdell, “The Ameri-
can Journal of Legal History” 1986, v. XXX; N. Cook, Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Pa-
radigm in the 21th Century, “North Dakota Law Review”, 2012, v. 82, no. 2.
26 This phrase is very often used in American discourse on legal education; however, there is
a problem to define what exactly it means. Very often it appears in the class books for the first
year law students: E. Mertz, The Language of Law Schools: Thinking Like a Lawyer,
Oxfor-New York 2007; F. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal
Reasoning¸ London 2009; K.J. Vandevellde, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, Boulder 2011.
27 R.A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and the Interpretations of Statutes and The
Constitution, “Case Western Reserve Law Review”, 1986-87, v. 37, no. 2, p. 182ff.; The origin of
American Legal Formalism is described in: M.J. Horowitz, Transformation of American Law
1780-1860, Cambridge-London 1977, p. 253-269. See also: W.M. Wieck, The Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America 1886-1937, New York-Oxford 1998.
The second American method of teaching law, the Clinical Legal
Education,28 is not an independent method, for it merely supplements
and corrects the drawbacks of Langdell’s one. It was developed in the
outcome of the criticism of American formalism and Langdell’s method
by legal realists.29 They claimed that law was only when certain rules
were actually exercised, not when they were only hypothetically binding.
In this actual view, law (law in action) consisted of only formally binding
rules (law in books) which were actually applied by courts.30 Langdell’s
method of teaching law was not completely dismissed by realists, for it
put emphasis on investigating judicial decisions. However, it was
accused of being detached from reality and teaching students “thinking
like a professor” rather than a lawyer.31 For those reasons, realists
proposed that the method should be at least supplemented with the
so-called clinical education.
The notion was adopted from medicine, where it meant teaching
students how to treat by providing medical aid to ill individuals under
supervision of a professor-doctor. The transfer of that method from
medicine to law stemmed from a conviction that the only way to learn
law was to practice it from early beginning by providing legal aid to the
poor, in some minor cases, under supervision of a professor who verified
and corrected the work of students. Apart from practical knowledge of
law, jurisprudence, and factors necessary to obtain specific results, the
method showed how to teach students practical skills such as client
handling and accessing information.32 And finally, the method combined
academia with social-oriented activity, teaching students sensitivity to
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Cooperation, “Journal of Legal Education”, 1987, vol. 37; J.S. Bradway, The Legal Aid Clinic as
an Educational Device, “The American Law Review”, 1934, vol. 7; Clinical Education for the
Law Students In a Service Setting, Minoela – New York 1978; A.G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education – 21th century perspective, “Journal of Legal Education”, 1984, v. 34.
29 See: J. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, “University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view ” 1933, v. 81, no. 8.
30 This phrases are attributed to Roscoe Pound, who used them in his paper “Law in Books
and Law in Action”, but it is emphasised that the essence of this distinguishing was more profo-
undly depicted by Karl Llewellyn. J.L. Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem
of Legal Change, “Maine Law Review” 2011, v. 64 no. 1, p. 46. See also: R. Pound, Law in Books
and Law in Action, “American Law Review” 1910, v. 44; K. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence
– The Next Step, “Columbia Law Review” 1930, v. 30, no. 4.
31 See for example: H.T. Edwards, Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Professions, “Michigan Law Review”, 1992, v. 91, p. 34.
32 M. Spiegel, Theor y and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, “UCLA Law Review” 1987, v. 34.
social problems, and pro bono work.33 As opposed to Langdell’s method,
the aim of the Clinical Legal Education method was to teach not only
fact analysis, legal rules, and argumentation (all in classroom), but
equip students with genuine knowledge of how law functions, and teach
them how to handle clients properly.
Although the first proposals to implement the Clinical Legal Education
method were put forward in the 1920s, it was not until the 1960s and
the 1970s that it became more popular, which was triggered by
emancipation movements in the USA in the 1950s and the 1960s. Free
legal aid provided by students undoubtedly raised legal awareness of the
citizens and contributed to the success of those movements.34 Although
Clinical Legal Education never won against Langdell’s method, it
became one of the compulsory courses in the majority of American
schools of law.
The last method to be discussed in the paper is the Problem Solving
Method.35 The method derived from the criticism of Langdell’s method
which was accused of educating the so-called “hired guns” lawyers
concerned only with legal problems, which was not exactly for the good
of the client.36 The advocates of the method claim that the problems,
which clients bring to lawyers, are hardly ever only of legal nature.
Those problems tend to be more complex, which requires from lawyers
not only the knowledge of law, argumentation, and analytical abilities,
but also the ability to set goals, together with the client, and plan how to
achieve them.37 The traditional way of teaching law was too concerned
with legal issues and the lawyer itself, at the same time diminishing the
problems of the client, forgetting about proper interpersonal relations
with them and about their best interest. The proposals of the new
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33 P. Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Education,
“Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice”, 2012, v. 32, I. 2.
34 J.C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, “SMU Law Review” 1998, v. 51;
A. Sedillo Lopez, Learning through Service in a Clinical Setting: The Effect of Specialization on
Social Justice and Skills Training, “Clinical Law Review” 2001, v. 7.
35 See: M. Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method It’s Time to Teach with Problems, “Journal of
Legal Education”, 1992, Vol. 42; D. Coursin, Comment, Acting like a lawyer, “Wisconsin Law
Review”, 2010; P. Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors
and Problem Solvers, “Law and Contemporary Problems”, 1995, vol. 58; M.N. Mosley, The
reports of Socrates Demise have been greatly Exaggerated, A response to bang goes theory –
debunking traditional legal education, “Phoenix Law Review”, 2010, vol. 3.
36 J. Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in
Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, “California Western Law Review” 1998, v. 34, No. 2,
p. 353ff.
37 T. D. Barthon, Creative Problem Solving: Purpose, Meaning and Values, “California
Western Law Review” 1998, v. 34, no. 2.
method were proposed in reaction to the weak points of the traditional
method of teaching. According to the advocates of the new method,
students studied law back to front, that is starting from judicial
sentences. It would be more reasonable, however, to first get acquainted
with the client’s problem and then refer to judicial decisions and their
argumentation. Therefore, it was suggested that teaching law should
incorporate discussions, workshops, or role plays as the techniques
which teach students interpersonal skills and, at the same time, allow
them to practice legal analysis and work out possibly the best solution to
the client’s problem.38
According to the advocates of the new method, the old one aimed at
preparing confrontation and conflict-oriented lawyers who tend to bring
cases to court. Yet, lawyers should concentrate on solving the problem
and go to court as the last resort. They should first try to find a simpler
solution. The role of a lawyer should not therefore be confined to those
traditionally understood professional areas. The lawyer should take the
role of a versatile advisor rather than a professional plenipotentiary. In
this view, the lawyer is no longer a “hired gun”, but a personal advisor
who co-decides on and bears joint responsibility for setting goals and
achieving them. Without a doubt, that concept has a lot in common with
the proposal to promote alternative ways of solving conflicts rather than
solve every problem in court, especially when it concerns those areas of
life where court intervention is inadvisable like, for instance, in the case
of family relation issues.39 It also has a lot in common with the more and
more popular vision of what the legal services market should be like. It
should now offer more complex customer service involving not only legal
issues.40
The article discussed the origins and philosophical fundamentals
underlying particular methods of teaching law in the contemporary
USA. The cultural context within which those methods were established
and function now, and their ideological justification, will play the key
role in evaluating the possibility of applying them in Poland. Certain
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Communities, “Rutgers Law Review”, 2009, v. 61, no. 4, p. 1099-1114.
39 C. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything – Lawyer as The Problem Solver,
“Hofstra Law Review” 1999-2000, v. 28, p. 905-924. That attitude requires from lawyers a lot of
creativity, and from law schools to develop this creativity in future lawyers. Idem, Aha? Is
Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, “Harvard
Negotiation Law Review” 2001, v. 6, p. 97-144.
40 On challenges facing legal profession and lawyering see: R. Susskind, The End of Lawy-
ers?: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services, Oxford 2010; T.D. Morgan, The Changing Face of
Legal Education: Its Impact on What it Means to be a Lawyer, “Akron Law Review” 2012, v. 45.
elements of the American legal culture have already become universal,
owing to globalisation processes. Nonetheless, it does not follow that
most of them have to or can be transplanted to the Polish reality, at
least not in a “copy-paste” manner known from text editors. That
unquestioned copying would resemble the famous sociological example of
the “cargo cult practices”. For this reason, it would only be, more or less,
an official ideological curtain obscuring entirely different legal reality.
On the other hand, a thoughtful application and implementation of some
of the American solutions could be highly beneficial also to the legal
education in Poland, providing that they could fit in with the Polish
legal culture. It would have to be a more creative compilation rather
than a total transplant of elements of an alien legal culture, no matter
how modern and trendy they were.
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PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL BASIS OF THE MAIN METHODS
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE USA
Abstract: The article aims to provide an overview of the most popular law teaching methods in
the USA (Langdell’s Case Study together with Socratic Method, Clinical Legal Education, and
Problem Solving Method) with reference to the cultural context and philosophical background.
First, the characteristic features of the American legal culture with regard to teaching law and
ideological grounds of the American legal education are presented. Then the methods are
discussed together with the context in which they were developed and the arguments for
implementing them.
Keywords: AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION, CASE STUDY AND SOCRATIC METHOD,
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, PROBLEM SOLVING METHOD, CULTURAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
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